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A fact of life for farmers, hunter-gatherers, and fishermen in the rural parts of the world
are that crops fail, wild resources become scarce, and winds discourage fishing. In this
article we approach subsistence risk from the perspective of “coexistence thinking,”
the simultaneous application of natural and supernatural causal models to explain
subsistence success and failure. In southwestern Madagascar, the ecological world is
characterized by extreme variability and unpredictability, and the cosmological world
is characterized by anxiety about supernatural dangers. Ecological and cosmological
causes seem to point to different risk minimizing strategies: to avoid losses from drought,
flood, or heavy winds, one should diversify activities and be flexible; but to avoid losses
caused by disrespected spirits one should narrow one’s range of behaviors to follow
the code of taboos and offerings. We address this paradox by investigating whether
southwestern Malagasy understand natural and supernatural causes as occupying
separate, contradictory explanatory systems (target dependence), whether they make
no categorical distinction between natural and supernatural forces and combine them
within a single explanatory system (synthetic thinking), or whether they have separate
natural and supernatural categories of causes that are integrated into one explanatory
system so that supernatural forces drive natural forces (integrative thinking). Results
from three field studies suggest that (a) informants explain why crops, prey, and market
activities succeed or fail with reference to natural causal forces like rainfall and pests,
(b) they explain why individual persons experience success or failure primarily with
supernatural factors like God and ancestors, and (c) they understand supernatural
forces as driving natural forces, so that ecology and cosmology represent distinct sets
of causes within a single explanatory framework. We expect that future cross-cultural
analyses may find that this form of “integrative thinking” is common in unpredictable
environments and is a cognitive strategy that accompanies economic diversification.
Keywords: culture, risk, causal cognition, unpredictability, traditional knowledge, cosmology, Madagascar
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Introduction
The subsistence farmer, forager, and ﬁsherman contemplating
choice of crops, livestock, and prey inevitably faces the reality that
crops fail, livestock sicken and die, foragers and ﬁshermen come
home empty handed, and selling prices in the marketplace drop.
Sometimes the causes of economic failures are easily observable.
Crops may fail because of drought or pests or because the farmer
did not spend enough time weeding, and a ﬁsherman may return
to shore with low catch due to unfavorable winds. In other cases
the reasons for failure may be less apparent. A farmer may lose
a bountiful crop the night before she intends to harvest due
to a sudden windstorm or grasshopper swarm. A ﬁsher may
unexpectedly ﬁnd that a batch of ﬁsh prepared for smoking have
turned rotten.
Human minds in their social contexts search for patterns and
meaning behind the causes of success and failure. People search
for covariations between environmental cues and subsistence
outcomes, in order to better predict, and thus seek to control,
their harvests of crops and wild resources. When unexpected
failure happens, people ask deeper questions such as why my
ﬁeld was destroyed and not my neighbor’s. Covariation theories
(Nisbett and Ross, 1980, p. 90–112), knowledge of the base rate
frequencies with which things happen (Cheng, 1997; Griﬃths
and Tenenbaum, 2005), and learned mechanisms for causality
(Ahn et al., 1995) are the building blocks composing cultural
models of causality (Waldmann et al., 2006) that people use
to make important subsistence choices and understand their
fortunes.
Subsistence risk is exactly the type of domain where one would
expect what Legare et al. (2012) call “coexistence thinking,” the
simultaneous application of natural and supernatural models
of causality to explain why things happen. The ethnographic
record is replete with examples of farmers, hunter-gatherers, and
ﬁshermen using a mix of ecological knowledge and cosmological
knowledge when making important decisions (Rappaport,
1968; Poggie and Pollnac, 1988; Lansing, 1991; Malinowski,
1992[1948]; Dove, 1993; Birkes et al., 2000; Orlove et al.,
2000; Hunn et al., 2003). Contrary to Victorian and modernist
notions that supernatural causality constitutes primitive thought
(Tylor, 1958[1871]) or childish thought (Piaget, 1928) that is
eventually replaced by a more sophisticated understanding of the
clockwork of the natural world, a recent review of experimental
studies demonstrates that coexistence thinking is pervasive in
modern, urban, educated contexts, and that adults often endorse
supernatural causes more frequently than children (Legare et al.,
2012).
How and when one may explain fortune and failure with
wind and rain versus angels and ancestors is an open question,
one that we pursue in this article. In a recent review by Legare
et al. (2012) they present a typology of coexistence thinking. In
“target-dependent thinking,” reasoners pick and choose natural
and supernatural causes to explain diﬀerent components of a
phenomena or in diﬀerent contexts. For example, in a study of
AIDS etiology in South Africa, Legare and Gelman (2008) quoted
one informant as saying that “witchcraft may cause a disease that
looks like AIDS.” In the context of people’s understanding of the
origins and diversity of life, a reasoner may justify divine creation
for humans because of a belief in the eternal soul but endorse
natural selection for a purportedly soulless animal (Evans et al.,
2011). Target dependence suggests that natural and supernatural
causal systems are separate and sometimes in conﬂict with one
another.
In “synthetic thinking,” natural and supernatural causes
are alike and co-exist within a single causal system, so that
unsafe sex and witches both cause AIDS, and natural selection
and God both inﬂuence life’s diversity. Synthetic thinking
implies that natural and supernatural forces are uniﬁed into
a single explanatory system. Ethnographic descriptions of
some indigenous South American cosmologies suggest that
some people understand persons, animals, and spirits to be
commensurate anthropomorphic agents (Descola, 1996; Viveiros
de Castro, 2000; but see Ramos, 2012), thus eschewing the
natural/supernatural dichotomy.
“Integrative thinking” refers to causal models where
supernatural forces drive natural forces; witchcraft causes people
to have unsafe sex and get AIDS, and God created the diversity of
life by means of natural selection. The best-known ethnographic
example of integrative thinking is probably Evans-Pritchard’s
(1937) description of Zande witchcraft in southwestern Sudan.
Zande understand that the cause of a granary collapsing is that
termites have eaten the wooden supports. But the ultimate cause,
the reason why termites attacked that particular granary so that
it fell when someone happened to be resting in its shadow, is
witchcraft, an evil power unleashed by a neighbor’s secret, jealous
thoughts. In integrative thinking, natural and supernatural
causes are categorically diﬀerentiated but occupy the same
explanatory system.
Although a population may apply all three modes of
coexistence thinking to the same causal problem, in the
studies reviewed by Legare et al. (2012, p. 790) subjects do
not apply each mode with the same frequency. For example
integrative explanations are the least common in studies of
people’s understanding of death as biological cessation versus
continuity into an afterlife (Harris and Giménez, 2005; Astuti and
Harris, 2008), presumably because biological death and ancestral
continuity are contradictory (although Astuti and Harris insist
that Vezo ﬁshermen have no problem accepting both).
This demands the question whether the frequency with which
people use target-dependent, synthetic, or integrative thinking
is the result of diﬀerences in the causal problems being solved
versus diﬀerences in the populations, or both. Variability across
causal problems is likely to be the results of the ecology
of risk associated with each problem. The causal problems
involved in rural subsistence strategies, such as forecasting
rainfall, harvests, or ﬁshing returns, are inﬂuenced by ecological
factors such as climatic variability, predictability and the visibility
of cues and covariations foreshadowing future events. Inter-
population variability would likely be due to diﬀerent culturally
learned causal models that compose what anthropologists have
called traditional ecological knowledge (Dove, 1993; Birkes
et al., 2000; Orlove et al., 2000; Hunn et al., 2003) and
cosmology (Descola, 1996; Viveiros de Castro, 2000; Howell,
2012).
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The case study from southwestern Madagascar presented in
this paper is intriguing because characteristics of the ecology
and culture seem to favor contradictory strategies to minimize
risk. The ecology (speciﬁcally, the climate) is characterized by
extremely high variability and unpredictability, so that the best
way to avoid risk is diversiﬁcation and behavioral ﬂexibility.
The culture (speciﬁcally, the cosmology) explains risk as caused
by disgruntled spiritual agents, so that people live in a state of
spiritual insecurity, “the sense of danger, doubt, and fear arising
from an awareness of exposure to invisible forces acting to cause
misfortune” (Ashforth, 2010, p. 43). The best way to avoid risk
associated with spiritual insecurity is to restrict the range of one’s
behaviors.
Antarctic winds, cyclones, and el Niño events conspire to
give Madagascar one of the most variable and unpredictable
climates in the world (Wright, 1999), what Dewar and Richard
(2007) call “a hypervariable environment.” In a comparison
of monthly rainfall data, Dewar and Richard (2007) found
that rainfall is less predictable across 15 Malagasy weather
stations contrasted to 15 stations in continental Africa, where
predictability was evaluated after Colwell (1974) as variability
that does not covary with month or season (low contingency).
Toliara, in southwestern Madagascar near where our study is
set, had the second lowest predictability score with a Colwell’s
P of 0.281. This means that even with exceptional ecological
knowledge a subsistence decision-maker can only ever have
28% conﬁdence in monthly rainfall forecasts. Farmers, foragers,
and ﬁshermen throughout the world often cope with ecological
unpredictability by diversifying their portfolios of crops, prey,
and market activities (Winterhalder et al., 1999), and this is a
common strategy in southwestern Madagascar (Tucker, 2001,
2006, 2007a,b; Tucker et al., 2010, 2013).
Ancestors, spirits, and a distant creator God observe the
living and reward and punish people according to how well
their behavior demonstrates respect. Crops fail and foragers and
ﬁshers come home empty handed because people transgress
the behavioral code of taboos, oﬀerings, other “cosmo-rules”
(to borrow a phrase from Howell, 2012), either mindfully or
accidentally.
A southwestern Malagasy person who wishes to avoid
misfortunes caused by disrespected spiritual agents should
observe dietary taboos, follow the astrological calendar of good
and bad days for subsistence labor, respect elders and traditional
magico-religious specialists, and not travel too far from the
houses of the protective spiritual agents, in tombs, enchanted
trees and rocks, and in the miniature houses that spirit mediums
construct behind their homes. But reducing the risks caused
by extreme weather conditions requires tracking a changing
environment and planning for multiple contingencies. It may
require exploiting a range of resources including those that
are taboo; scheduling labor ﬂexibly, even when the astrological
calendar indicates that the day is not propitious for working; and
traveling far from one’s homeland to exploit distant ﬁelds and
patches and traﬃc goods to market, distant from the terrain of
protecting spirits.
In this paper we consider the question of how southwestern
Malagasy people combine causal models involving wind and rain
which seem to advise ﬂexibility with causal models involving
God and spirits that seem to prescribe conformity. Legare et al.’s
(2012) modes of coexistence thinking suggest three possibilities.
One possibility is that our informants use target-dependent
thinking; they carry contradictory models around in their heads
simultaneously without justifying one with the other. As they
apply eachmodel in diﬀerent circumstances they bounce between
conforming and ﬂexible strategies. A second possibility is that
they consider rain, wind, God, and spirits to belong to a single
category of causes, composing a synthetic causal model with a
consistent internal logic. A synthetic model could prescribe both
conformity and ﬂexibility in diﬀerent circumstances, for example,
providing ritual ways to permit diversiﬁcation, for example, to
excuse exploitation of taboo resources or permit distant travel.
A third, integrative possibility is that natural and supernatural
forces belong to separate categories but a single causal model,
where supernatural forces drive natural outcomes. Using an
integrative model, farmers, foragers, and ﬁshers may make
subsistence choices using ecological knowledge, but then apply
cosmological knowledge after the fact to explain the successes
and failures of their forecasts and strategies. Our previous
ethnographic observations suggest that all three possibilities are
plausible.
We examine these possibilities in light of the ﬁndings from
three ﬁeld studies conducted in southwestern Madagascar. In the
ﬁrst study we asked groups of informants to rate and explain the
risk associated with diﬀerent crops, prey, and market activities.
We predicted that the groups would rate risks concordantly
with each other, indicating a shared body of cultural knowledge.
A second prediction, following Malinowski (1992[1948]), was
that people would cite more supernatural causes for riskier
activities. The ﬁrst prediction is conﬁrmed for the sample at
large with the exception of Vezo coastal ﬁshers. In contrast to
our second prediction, informants listed almost entirely natural
causes of risk such as rainfall and pests.
In the second study we asked individuals to explain the
reasons why a hypothetical man in a vignette harvested more
than his friend. We conducted an economic and a religious
version of the vignette to see whether subjects would provide
more natural causes in the former and more supernatural causes
in the latter, consistent with target-dependent thinking. Instead,
in both versions of the vignette informants provided primarily
supernatural causes like God and ancestors. When taken together
with the ﬁndings of Study 1, this suggests that our informants
understand activities as responding to natural causes while
personal successes and failures result from supernatural forces,
consistent with integrative thinking.
The third study used a card sorting activity to examine
the causal ﬂow of natural and supernatural factors, including
God, ancestors, weather, and harvest (similar to Lynch and
Medin, 2006). A target-dependent thinker with competing
causal epistemologies might depict independent natural and
supernatural chains of causes. A synthetic thinker who
treats natural and supernatural factors as coinﬂuential would
likely depict bilateral causal interactions among natural and
supernatural factors. Instead, results support a hierarchy of
causal factors with supernatural forces driving natural forces
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(integrative thinking). The speciﬁc form of the causal ﬂow
involves humans begging ancestors to beg God for good weather
resulting in a good harvest.
We propose that when reasoning about activity risk
divorced of personal context southwestern Malagasy reason
within a natural causal submodel or level represented by
the last two links in this chain (weather → harvest), but
when reasoning about people they employ the whole chain,
(humans → ancestors → God → weather → harvest). Thus
in southwestern Madagascar, natural and supernatural forces are
categorically distinct but occupy a single causal model rather
than forming competing epistemologies. We conclude with a
discussion of the signiﬁcance of these ﬁndings for understanding
the inﬂuences of culture and ecology on coexistence thinking, and
by considering whether “natural” and “supernatural” mean the
same thing in rural Madagascar as they seem to mean in Western
scholarly discourse.
Research into the eﬀects of culture and ecology on how people
understand the causal inﬂuence of natural and supernatural
factors on economic outcomes is signiﬁcant for several reasons.
Decision-making under risk is a classic topic within economics
where it is modeled using probability theory (Bernstein, 1996),
despite a growing body of evidence that people do not think
in terms of probability distributions (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001). This article oﬀers a cognitive
perspective on subsistence risk, and explores how culture
and ecology co-inﬂuence people’s understanding of risk. More
generally, it is signiﬁcant to understand how human minds in
their social contexts understand and organize causal knowledge
because this forms shared concepts of reality (ontology) and
ways for understanding this reality (epistemology). Studies of the
cultural and ecological determinants of coexistence thinking may
help us address the classic question whether all humans basically
understand the world as working in the same general way
(psychic unity of humankind) or whether thought is an inﬁnitely
variable cultural construction (cultural relativism; Stocking, 1987;
see discussion in Bender and Beller, 2011; Bender et al., 2012).
The Cultural Context
Southwestern Malagasy
The people of Madagascar are uniﬁed by a single language and
a similar set of traditional cosmological beliefs and practices, yet
there is signiﬁcant inter-regional variation in dialects, customs,
habits, beliefs, norms, and social institutions. This article pertains
speciﬁcally to Malagasy people living in the arid southwest
between the provincial capital of Toliara and the port of
Morombe. We refer to these people collectively as “southwestern
Malagasy,” although they refer to themselves as Masikoro, Mikea,
and Vezo. These are not ethnic groups in a traditional sense,
for “ethnic” implies that identity is inherited from parents and
is perceived to be intrinsic and essential, whereas identity in
southwestern Madagascar is more ﬂexible than this (Astuti, 1995,
2001; Astuti et al., 2004).
SouthwesternMalagasy commonly claim that to be aMasikoro
means that one is a farmer, a herder, and savanna dweller, while
a Mikea is a forest-based hunter-gatherer, and a Vezo is a coastal
gatherer, ﬁsher, and sailor. Mikea informants have often told us
that “Mikea” is a livelihood (velomampò) and not a “kind of
person” (karazan’olo) and that all hunter-gatherers in the world
are Mikea. Astuti (1995) reports similar statements from Vezo
about ﬁshing and ﬁshermen.
In practice this simple classiﬁcation meets with perpetual
exceptions. There are savanna farmers who call themselves
Mikea, coastal Vezo who farm, and Masikoro ﬁshermen.
Households also tend to be diversiﬁed, with diﬀerent members
practicing a range of farming, foraging, ﬁshing, herding, and
marketing activities, with activity portfolios changing over time.
We have argued that most of the contradictions are resolved if
we recognize that people also cite family, clan, and community
histories as reasons for claiming Masikoro, Mikea, or Vezo
identity. These histories trace back to the precolonial Andrevola
kingdom. People identify as Masikoro in part because their
ancestors were vassals to the Andrevola kings, while Mikea and
Vezo recall ancestors who resisted royal domination by hiding
in the forest or sailing away to sea (Yount et al., 2001; Tucker,
2003). In this article we assume that Masikoro, Mikea, and Vezo
constitute a single cultural group where members move in and
out of multiple subsistence options.
Risk and Ecology
SouthwesternMadagascar is a semi-arid limestone shelf bordered
by the Onilahy and Mangoky Rivers. The landscape is diverse.
Within the span of a 100 km east–west transect one may traverse
grassy savanna and savanna woodlands; the dense, dry, deciduous
Mikea Forest (Alamikea); the lakebeds, dunes, and thorn forests
of the Namonte Basin; followed by coastal mudﬂats, mangroves,
the shallow Bay of Fagnemotse; then white sandy beaches and a
barrier reef. Farmers plant crops like maize (Zea mays), manioc
(Manihot esculenta), and rice (Oryza sativa) in rainfed and
irrigated savanna ﬁelds, in forest swiddens, and in gardens in
the Namonte lakebeds on the coast. Foragers dig wild ovy tubers
(Dioscorea acuminata) in the deciduous forest, gather estivating
tenrecs (African hedgehogs, Echinops telfairi), and ﬁsh in the
fresh waters of the Namonte Basin and lake Ihotre. On the coast
people gather mud crabs (Scylla serrata) in the mangroves, collect
octopus (Octopus cyanea) and sea cucumbers (Holothuria and
Scabra sp.) in the shallows before the reef, and ﬁsh for ﬁnﬁsh,
shark, and sea turtles with lines and nets. Masikoro and Mikea
sell an average of 45% of their production in local markets and to
exporters, while Vezo sell an average of 87% (Tucker et al., 2010,
2013).
Our previous research into subsistence risk in the region
ﬁnds that agriculture produces more food by quantity but at
considerably greater risk than foraging or ﬁshing (Tucker et al.,
2010). A useful way to illustrate this is with a thought experiment.
Imagine that an individual will spend 90 days on just one
subsistence activity. 90 days of labor spent cultivating maize
would result in a two-hectare ﬁeld that would produce an average
of 1862 kg maize, or roughly 6.8 M calories. By contrast, 90 days
spent digging wild ovy tubers yields an average of 864 kg or
1.0 M calories. However, the maize farmer invests all her hopes
on a single harvest, one that is highly dependent on good rainfall
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and sparse pests. The wild tuber forager harvests every day,
distributing her risk over 90 foraging trips. If a tuber forager has a
string of bad days she canmove to a part of the forest that received
more rain or switch prey, options that are not available to the
farmer. In a set of simulations following this logic, we found that
agriculture tends to be an order of magnitude more risky than
foraging and ﬁshing (Tucker et al., 2010). When asked to rate the
risk of their subsistence activities, Masikoro, Mikea, and Vezo in
24 focus groups generally agreed that agriculture is riskier than
foraging and ﬁshing (Tucker et al., 2013).
Previous Evidence for Covariation Theories
In a previous study we tested whether southwestern Malagasy
have consistent covariation theories linking rainfall and the
outcomes of farming, foraging, and ﬁshing activities using an
historical matrix exercise in fourteen communities (10 Mikea,
two Vezo-Mikea, and two Masikoro) in 1999 (Tucker, 2007a).
The method involved creating a tabular grid of playing cards
on the ground in which rows represent the past 5 years,
the ﬁrst column represents rainfall, and subsequent columns
represent crops and prey. A group of informants was instructed
to work together to pour sand on to each card representing
the quantity rainfall or harvest in each year. Working as
a group engendered conversation. Of 95 comments that we
recorded, 22 were statements of quantity (e.g., “a lot”), 28 were
statements of events (“the year of the big cyclone”), and 45
were statements of rules (“when there is a lot of rain, there
is no honey”). Rule statements and rank-order correlations
between the sand piles in the rainfall and harvest columns
were quite consistent. Groups agreed that, “when there is no
rain, there is no maize,” “manioc hates rain,” “rain destroys
rice irrigation schemes,” and “ﬁsh drink water, too” (meaning,
there are more ﬁsh in rainy years). This evidence suggests
that southwestern Malagasy have shared ecological knowledge
of the causal interactions between rainfall and economic
outcomes.
Cosmology
In the traditional cosmology of southwestern Madagascar the
creator God Ndragnahare (called Zanahary or Andriamanitra
elsewhere in Madagascar) is distant and people interact most
commonly with ancestors (raza) and spirits that possessmediums
in trance ceremonies (doane). These invisible forces observe the
personal lives of human beings and their judgment results in
triumphs or failures.
Recent theories about the evolution of religion have proposed
that rewards and punishments by omniscient “high moralizing
gods” (Norenzayan, 2013) or by a “broad spectrum” of moralizing
supernatural agents (as Watts et al., 2015 argue is more
appropriate to Austronesian cultures) function to reinforce
cooperative norms by rewarding niceness and punishing
selﬁshness. Malagasy cosmology ﬁts imperfectly within this
scheme. In Madagascar, the ancestors and other spirits are not
omniscient, they may deceive and be deceived, and the moral
code they reinforce is primarily one of respect, for God, for the
universe, and especially, for the spiritual agents themselves and
their earthly representatives, elders, spirit mediums, and diviners
(Ruud, 1960; Feeley-Harnik, 1991; Sharp, 1993; Graeber, 2007;
Astuti and Bloch, 2015).
For example, a man may commit a selﬁsh act like killing
his neighbor’s livestock out of jealously. Ancestors and other
spirits are unlikely to punish this oﬀense. The livestock owner
may consult a diviner who may, through divination with grains
(sikily), learn from the spirits that the neighbor is guilty and that
the neighbor has “bad ideas” (raty hevitse) or “a bad soul” (raty
say). Still, spirits issue no punishment. But had the bad person
killed cattle that had been allocated for sacriﬁce to the ancestors,
this would have been a clear oﬀense that the ancestors would have
punished forthwith.
Although ancestors, spirits, and God rarely directly reward
interpersonal niceness and punish meanness, the code of respect
that they enforce is prosocial, for it creates the traditional social
structure. Ancestors may be capricious and selﬁsh but they
are essentially good because they connect the living to tombs
(lolo), to the land (tanindraza), to one’s clan (firazagna), and
one’s community (filongoa), securing one’s social identity, right
to material and social resources, and membership in a larger
intergenerational corporate program (Bloch, 1971, 2008; Feeley-
Harnik, 1991; Graeber, 2007). Participating in clan activities
and maintaining community sentiment requires interpersonal
niceness (and sometimes meanness to enemies or criminals),
even though interpersonal acts are not the major concern of
supernatural agents1.
People consult with the spirit world by performing clan
ceremonies and livestock sacriﬁce to honor ancestors under the
direction of the clan head (mpitokazomanga), through trance
ceremonies with mediums (tromba), through divination under
the guidance of the diviner (ambiasa, called ombiasy elsewhere in
Madagascar), and, for a rare few, through knowledge of astrology
(andro, vinta). People demonstrate respect for the supernatural
primarily by respecting a code of dangers or taboos called
faly (fady elsewhere in Madagascar) that limits dietary choices,
sexual behavior, clothing, mobility, permissible speech, and other
behaviors (Ruud, 1960). Each individual has her own personal set
of faly associated with place, clan, astrological destiny (vinta), and
magical charms (aoly). People acknowledge a common calendar
of good and bad days for diﬀerent activities (andro). Most people
know that one should refrain from work on Mondays and
Thursdays; some also know the taboos associated with particular
month-day combinations, and the correspondence of dates with
stellar positions.
In a survey of 550 Masikoro, Mikea, and Vezo in the study
region we found that 17% claimed to be Lutheran (mostly
Masikoro) and 17% claimed to be Catholic (mostly Vezo).
While some Christians publicly eschew traditional religion,
1Interpersonal magical attacks (sorcery) compose a parallel moral system.
Returning to the example of the man who discovers though divination that his
jealous neighbor has killed his livestock, theman could ask the diviner to encourage
the spirits to cause harm to the wrongdoing neighbor. Only a minority of sorcerers
are capable of attack magic (vorike), for it requires “dirty” magical substances
(volohazomaloto) and is generally considered to be immoral. The moral code
enforced by sorcery may encourage niceness (to avoid attacks by neighbors) as
Evans-Pritchard (1937) argued for Zande witchcraft; but, judging by the amount
of gossip we hear on the topic and the ubiquity of the protective magic that people
wear, sorcery seems to encourage suspicion, envy, enmity, and discord.
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many self-identifying Christians in the region host and attend
traditional ceremonies, consult with clan heads, spirit mediums,
and diviners, and show every other sign of conforming to
traditional Malagasy cosmological expectations.
Study 1: Popular Concepts of Risk for
Subsistence Activities
The ﬁrst study has been published elsewhere framed in pursuit
of a diﬀerent set of questions (Tucker et al., 2013); the study
is reviewed here in light of its contributions to the topic of
coexistence thinking. Study 1 explored shared concepts of risk
for diﬀerent crops, prey, and market activities, and the causes for
activity risk. In the context of group interviews we asked people
to deﬁne risk, list their subsistence activities, provide reasons why
each activity is risky, and then rate the risk of each activity on
a four-point scale. If our informants use coexistence thinking
when reasoning about subsistence risk then the groups should
cite a combination of natural and supernatural causes for activity
risk. A second prediction, inspired by Malinowski (1992[1948]),
was that people would cite more supernatural causes for higher
risk activities. Our third prediction was that if informants have a
consistent body of knowledge about risk, groups should rate risks
concordantly.
Sample
We interviewed groups rather than individuals because we were
interested in shared, public knowledge, and group interview
settings encourage individuals to provide “normal” answers
(Smithson, 2000). We convened 24 sex-segregated focus groups
in 12 villages in 2008. The villages were a mix ofMasikoro farmers
(N = 3 sites), Mikea forager-farmers (N = 6 sites), Vezo coastal
ﬁshers (N = 2 sites), and Tandroy farmers (N = 1 site; Tandroy
migrated to the region from southern Madagascar in the 1930s).
Group interviews occurred after a meeting with the townspeople
(fokon’olo) in which we explained our research objectives and
sought community consent. We divided the pool of willing adults
intomale and female groups of 6–10 each and sought oral consent
to conduct the research. Two Malagasy researchers of the same
sex as the informants posed the questions.
First we asked people to deﬁne risk. Two words for risk
had come to our attention in previous research: risike, from
the French risque, and kitahitahy, which literally means “little
blessing” but could also mean potential fortune. We did not seek
to distinguish one term from the other but simply asked the
informant to explain risike or kitahitahy and let them choose
which word to use2. Then we asked the assembly to list their
most signiﬁcant subsistence activities and to rate each subsistence
activity on a four-point scale: not risky (tsy misy risike), low
risk (risidrisike avao), risky (misy risike), or very risky (risike
mare). As the groups discussed their ratings we asked them to
provide reasons (causes) for why each activity is potentially risky.
2In the risk deﬁnitions, seven responses used the term risike, including at least one
Masikoro, one Mikea, and one Vezo speaker. Two responses used kitahitahy, both
Mikea (although two other Mikea used risike). One speaker, a Masikoro woman,
used both terms.
Research participants were served cookies and coﬀee, and no
other compensation was provided. This method was approved
by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Georgia
(2007-10358-0).
Results
From the 24 focus groups we received 31 deﬁnitions of risk, which
fall roughly into four categories: risk is something you must face
in order to gain something (N = 19), risk means youmight win or
you might not (N = 12), risk is something that requires courage
to face (N = 12), and risk is what happens when many factors
predict an outcome (N = 4). Of the 31 deﬁnitions, only three,
belonging this ﬁnal category, mentioned supernatural causes.
The groups listed 53 unique crops, prey, and other economic
activities. Average activity risk ratings are calculated over
diﬀerentNs because some activities were listed by only one group
while others were listed by all 14. Table 1 summarizes the risk
ratings for activities listed by four or more groups. The seven
agricultural activities are all listed among the top 12 riskiest
activities alongside collecting sea cucumbers and marine line
ﬁshing and big game hunting (bushpig, shark). Across all 53
activities the average ratings were, for agriculture, M = 1.96,
SD = 0.80; for forest foraging, M = 0.98, SD = 1.05; for marine
foraging, M = 1.94, SD = 0.91, and for marketing activities,
M = 1.09, SD = 1.12. For those activities listed by at least four
groups, the ratings were, for agriculture, M = 2.09, SD = 0.69;
for forest foraging, M = 1.03, SD = 1.05; for marine foraging,
M = 2.00, SD = 0.80, and for marketing activities, M = 1.13,
SD = 1.07.
Table 2 summarizes inter-group agreement as measured by
Cohen’s Kappa. This analysis was conduced on a dataset of
all unique combinations of paired ratings for each product
(N = 606). On average there was a 42.74% agreement across all
pairs of ratings, which is signiﬁcantly greater than the 29.72%
agreement expected by chance κ = 0.18(606), p ≤ 0.001. Landis
and Koch (1977, p. 165) label this “moderate” consensus. Inter-
group agreement was moderate for men κ = 0.32(135), p≤ 0.001,
just above traditional 0.05 alpha levels for women κ = 0.08(139),
p = 0.066, and signiﬁcant for Masikoro k = 0.22(48), p = 0.005,
Mikea κ = 0.16(168), p ≤ 0.001 and Tandroy κ = 0.80(9),
p ≤ 0.001, but not Vezo κ = 0.10(43), p = 0.153.
In total, informants oﬀered 239 causes for risk. Nearly all
were natural causes, including pests (N = 79), rainfall (N = 35),
dangerous encounters with animals, bandits, or gendarmes
(N = 26), and risk of injury (N = 18). Only two of the 239
causes were supernatural. A Mikea woman said success ﬁshing
for snakehead ﬁsh depends on the astrological signiﬁcance of the
day (andro). Another Mikea woman said that honey foraging is
risky because one might encounter a tsiboko, an undead creature
with glowing red eyes.
Discussion
Our ﬁrst prediction was that groups would supply a mix of
natural and supernatural causes for activity risk, consistent with
coexistence thinking. Much to our surprise, both risk deﬁnitions
and causes of risk were almost entirely earthly and secular. This
could suggest that our informants preferentially rely on ecological
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TABLE 1 | A rank ordered summary of groups’ average risk ratings for activities listed by four or more groups.
Activity Crop/prey scientific name Subsistence mode N (focus groups
who rated)
Average risk (0 = not
risky–3 = very risky)
Standard deviation
(disagreement)
Lesser hedgehog tencec Echinops telfairi Forest foraging 7 0.14 0.38
Trapping birds Various sp. Forest foraging 4 0.25 0.50
Wage labor replanting rice Market 7 0.43 0.79
Digging ovy tubers Dioscorea acuminata Forest foraging 8 0.50 0.76
Freshwater fishing, line Tilapia sp. Forest foraging 4 0.75 0.96
Gathering and selling fuelwood Market 9 0.78 0.97
Wage labor, rice tilling Market 6 0.83 0.98
Hunting mouse lemur Microcebus murinus Forest foraging 4 1.00 0.82
Tobacco retailing Market 4 1.00 0.82
Coffee vending Market 9 1.56 1.01
Marine finfish, with net Various sp. Marine fishing 6 1.67 0.81
Shop keeping Market 11 1.73 1.19
Honey gathering Apis mellifera Forest foraging 8 1.75 0.89
Sea cucumber gathering, night Holothuria sp.; Scabra sp. Marine fishing 4 1.75 1.26
Pumpkin Cucurbita pepo Agriculture 6 1.83 0.41
Sea cucumber gathering, day Holothuria sp.; Scabra sp. Marine fishing 6 1.83 0.98
Gathering octopus Octopus cyanea Agriculture 7 1.86 0.38
Vohem beans Phaseolus sp. Agriculture 7 1.86 0.38
Sweet potato Ipomoea batatas Agriculture 9 1.89 0.60
Onion Allium cepa Agriculture 5 2.00 0.71
Maize Zea mays Agriculture 12 2.08 0.90
Marine finfish, line Various sp. Marine fishing 5 2.20 0.45
Manioc Manihot esculenta Agriculture 14 2.21 0.70
Rice Oryza sativa Agriculture 9 2.56 0.73
Bushpig hunting Potamocorus larvatus Forest foraging 5 2.80 0.45
Shark netting Unidentified sp. Marine fishing 4 3.00 0.00
Adapted from Tucker et al. (2013, p. 401–402).
knowledge when reasoning about activities, or that the domain
of subsistence is immune from coexistence thinking. It is also
possible that the public nature of group methods discouraged
discussion of supernatural causes. Our second prediction, that
southwestern Malagasy would provide more supernatural causes
for riskier activities, is not supported given that almost no
supernatural causes were provided.
Our third prediction, that our informants would largely agree
about the riskiness of their activities, received partial support, for
TABLE 2 | Summary of analysis of agreement between all pairs of risk










All 606 42.74 29.72 0.18 7.70 0.000
Women 139 30.94 25.52 0.08 1.50 0.066
Men 135 58.52 39.03 0.32 5.14 0.000
Masikoro 48 45.83 30.73 0.22 2.59 0.005
Mikea 168 38.10 26.53 0.16 3.48 0.000
Vezo 43 44.19 37.75 0.10 1.02 0.153
Tandroy 9 88.89 44.44 0.80 3.34 0.000
Adapted from Tucker et al. (2013, p. 402).
there was moderate agreement in risk ratings across the whole
sample, excluding Vezo. The low agreement in the Vezo sample
is likely due to the fact that Vezo are the most specialized on
one mode of subsistence, marine foraging, and listed exclusively
ﬁshing and market activities. The ordered list of perceived risk
in Table 1 shows that activities roughly cluster by mode, so
that forest foraging activities are lowest risk, marine ﬁshing is
moderately risky, and agriculture is the most risky. Southwestern
Malagasymay agreemore on the order of risk among thesemodes
rather than among individual activities within these modes.
We do not have a satisfactory explanation for why there was
less agreement among the female focus groups than the male
groups. We would expect men and women to have similar
experience with most of these crops and prey, for men and
women work in the same ﬁelds and forage for the same terrestrial
resources (excluding bushpig, which are exclusively hunted by
men), although the division of labor is clearer for marine ﬁshing,
where men exploit deeper waters.
Study 2: Differential Economic Success
Vignette
The purpose of the next study is to get a clearer picture of when
and how southwestern Malagasy employ coexistence thinking.
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While study 1 asked about activity risk, in this study we asked
individuals to discuss why persons succeed or fail. The method
involved a vignette about two men, Reolo and Tsiato3, who
are good friends but not close kin, who discover one day that
Reolo consistently harvests more than Tsiato. Informants were
asked to provide possible causes for Reolo’s greater success. We
conducted two versions of the vignette, one framed around a
market scene and the other around a funeral. If the domain of
subsistence is immune to coexistence thinking, then we would
predict that informants would provide primarily natural causes,
as they did in the previous study. Target dependence would be
demonstrated if our informants primarily provided ecological
causes when the vignette was framed around a market scene
and supernatural causes when framed around a funeral scene.
Synthetic thinking should lead to informants providing a mix of
natural and supernatural causes as if these were commensurate
kinds of inﬂuencing factors. If participants favor supernatural
causes (in contrast to Study 1), then a few interpretations are
possible. They may be using a kind of target-dependent thinking
with which they explain activity risk (Study 1) and personal risk
(Study 2) with competing causal models. Or it could be that
they understand harvests to be the result of natural forces where
natural forces are ultimately inﬂuenced by supernatural forces
that reward and punish individuals (integrative thinking).
Sample
These data were collected in the Mikea community of
Bevondrorano and the Vezo village of Lamboara in 2014.
Bevondro is a series of Masikoro and Mikea villages clustered
around two small lakes on the eastern edge of the Mikea Forest,
where people divide their time among forest foraging, lake
ﬁshing, and ﬂoodplain cultivation of manioc, sweet potatoes,
and rice. Bevondrorano is one of the Bevondro villages, settled
within the past 2 years by Mikea displaced by the new Mikea
Forest National Park4. Bevondrorano is home to Mikea we have
3Reolo means “Mr. Person” and Tsiato means “not here.” These equivalents of
“John Doe” are nonetheless realistic names.
4Bevondrorano was a well-known subsistence environment for these Mikea
families even before they were displaced by the Park, as many lived part of the
year here to sharecrop manioc, do rice wage labor, dig wild babo tubers (Dioscorea
acuminata) and sell game to savanna people. Bevondrorano people have many
Mikea kin among the greater Bevondro community. They were not displaced by
known since the 1990s from forest camps and the villages of the
Namonte Basin. The Vezo village of Lamboara, located on a small
island in the mouth of the Bay of Fagnemotse, is among the older
settlements on the Vezo coast, having been established in the 19th
century.
The samples for Studies 2 and 3 are described in Table 3.
For Study 2 we recruited 12 adult participants in Bevondrorano
(nine women, three men) and 24 in Lamboara (14 women, 10
men). Nine Lamboara people also participated in Study 3. Due
to time constraints we did not attempt random sampling. These
samples represent roughly a quarter of the total population in
both communities.
Method
We interviewed individuals in the shade of our camp or near their
homes.We attempted to talk to people in private, but participants
were sometimes accompanied by a spouse or friend, and by young
children in their care. After obtaining oral consent we began
with a series of questions about the individual’s household size,
education, frequency of church attendance, and ownership of a
set of productive and luxury assets, from which we calculated
a wealth score5. The instrument is presented in its original
Malagasy form and in English in supplemental materials.
We administered an economic and a religious version of our
vignette, each to half the sample. The script for the economic
version of the vignette is as follows.
I am going to tell you an imaginary story about two men,
Reolo and Tsiato. Reolo and Tsiato are good friends, but they
come from diﬀerent families, and they live in diﬀerent villages
that are rather far away from each other. What both men
have in common is that they both work constantly to manage
their household economy, particularly by frequent buying and
selling in marketplaces. In fact, it is at the market that the two
men often see each other, and share news over a cup of coﬀee.
force, but by policies by Madagascar National Parks that made forest life more
complicated.
5The wealth score included two assets that are most commonly owned byMasikoro
and Mikea (land, cattle) and two commonly owned by Vezo (ocean-going canoes,
shark ﬁshing nets). The other assets were equally likely to be owned by anyone with
ﬁnancial capital: oxcart, radio, generator, and telephone.
TABLE 3 | Sample characteristics for Studies 2 and 3.
Village study Sample size Age1 Mean Frequency of
church attendance2
Mean Years of formal
education
Wealth3
Total Women Young adult Adult Old adult Low High
Bevondrorano (Mikea)
Study 2 12 9 4 7 1 0.4 1.2 10 2
Lamboara (Vezo)
Study 2 24 14 3 17 4 1.3 4.3 16 8
Study 3 22 10 2 15 5 1.4 4.0 10 12
1Based on a visual estimate by the authors.
2Average of responses scaled as 0 = never, 1 = sometimes, 2 = frequently.
3 Informants asked if they own eight common assets (land, cattle, oxcart, ocean-going canoe, shark fishing net, radio, generator, and telephone). Low = owns 0–3 assets;
high = owns 4–6 assets. Mean = 1.8 assets, max = 6 assets.
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One day when they talk together about their lives, they are
surprised to learn that Reolo consistently harvests more crops
than does Tsiato, whether it is maize, rice, or manioc. Tsiato
harvests much less than his good friend does.
The second version of the vignette was religiously framed.
I am going to tell you an imaginary story about two men, Reolo
and Tsiato. Reolo and Tsiato are good friends, but they come
from diﬀerent families, and they live in diﬀerent villages that
are rather far away from each other. What both men have in
common is that they both work constantly to manage family
aﬀairs, particularly by attending many of family ceremonies,
such as circumcision, rites of ﬁliation, and funerals. They often
see each other in the ceremonies, where they exchange news.
One day when they talk together about their lives, they are
surprised to learn that Reolo consistently harvests more crops
than does Tsiato, whether it is maize, rice, or manioc. Tsiato
harvests much less than his good friend does.
With Vezo research subjects, we substituted harvest of “maize,
rice, manioc” with harvest of “ﬁsh, octopus, and sea cucumbers.”
It is important that Reolo and Tsiato do not live close to one
another so that their economic activities are not inﬂuenced by the
same weather. It is important that they are not kin so that they do
not share the same ancestors. The vignettes were accompanied
by drawings of either two Malagasy men shaking hands in a
marketplace or at a funeral.
After telling the story we ﬁrst asked the informant to
voluntarily list reasons why Reolo experienced better success
than Tsiato (because participants may have diﬀerent explanations
for gains versus losses, we consistently emphasized Reolo’s
success relative to Tsiato’s failure). Then we presented a list
of possible causal factors and asked the informant whether
she would endorse each cause. We provided seven natural
factors (e.g., rainfall, wind, and pests), three social factors
(age, poverty, jealous neighbors), and six supernatural
factors (e.g., God, ancestors, taboo transgression, etc).
These factors are listed, along with a summary of results,
in Table 4. When the exercise was completed informants
received a small cash gift (1000 MGA, $0.50 USD, equivalent
to 10 cups of coﬀee). This method was approved by
the University of Georgia’s Institutional Review Board
(MOD00001573).
TABLE 4 | Frequency that different natural and supernatural factors were listed or endorsed by Mikea and Vezo informants.
Factors listed voluntarily by
informants
Factors endorsed by informants
when listed by the researcher
Factors listed and
endorsed
Mikea Vezo Mikea Vezo Mikea Vezo
N 12 24 12 24 12 24
Natural factors
Rainfall 3 0 3 3 6 3
Hard work 5 5 3 9 8 14
PestsM/WindV 0 0 6 3 6 3
Good landM/good canoeV 2 0 1 3 3 3
WeedsM/good netsV 0 0 1 4 1 4
Inherited landM/good swimmerV 1 0 2 1 3 1
FertilizerM 0 0 0 0 0 0
Social factors
Age 0 0 2 4 2 4
Poverty 0 0 2 4 2 4
Jealous neighbors 0 0 2 2 2 2
Didn’t do bad things to others∗ 0 1 0 0 0 1
Good parents∗ 1 2 0 0 1 2
Supernatural factors
Ancestors 7 20 2 3 9 23
Possessing spirits 2 1 7 7 9 8
God 11 23 1 1 12 24
Magic 5 4 5 4 10 8
Other people’s magical attack 0 0 1 0 1 0
Transgression of taboos 0 0 8 8 8 8
Astrological destiny 3 0 5 17 8 17
Church attendance 0 0 10 9 10 9
“Anjara” (turn)∗ 0 10 0 0 0 10
Astrological day∗ 0 1 0 0 0 1
Each informant listed 0–5 causes; when presented with the remaining causes in this list, each endorsed 2–14 additional causes. M, asked to Mikea only; V, asked to Vezo
only. ∗Factors introduced by informants that were not part of our original list.
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Results
Informants voluntarily listed 0–5 causes (M = 3.0, SD= 1.2), and
endorsed an additional 2–14 causes (M = 7.0, SD = 2.7). Because
of this variation in total number of causes listed and endorsed, all
analyses that follow examine the percent of supernatural causes
out of the total causes the individual listed or endorsed.
There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences by version of the vignette
in the percent of causes that were supernatural, listed [economic
version M = 82.9, SD = 28.4; religious version M = 75.4,
SD = 28.5; t = 0.790(36), p = 0.435] or endorsed [economic
version M = 76.6, SD = 22.1; religious version M = 72.8,
SD = 18.4; t = −1.035(36), p = 0.308]. We combine results from
both versions in the remaining analyses.
There were also no statistical diﬀerences in the responses of
women versus men, listed [women M = 80.4, SD = 25.9; men
M = 76.5, SD = 33.2; t = 0.384(36), p = 0.703] or endorsed
[women M = 76.2, SD = 20.3; men M = 71.8, SD = 20.0;
t = −1.018(36), p = 0.316]; by wealth, listed [low M = 77.1,
SD = 31.4; highM = 83.8, SD = 18.9; t = −0.632(36), p= 0.531]
or endorsed [low M = 72.8, SD = 21.0; high M = 79.3,
SD = 17.5; t = 1.740(36), p = 0.091]; by frequency of attendance
to a Christian church, listed [never M = 79.0, SD = 19.6;
sometimes M = 80.1, SD = 29.9; always M = 76.0, SD = 34.3;
F = 0.06(N = 36, df = 2), p = 0.944] or endorsed [never
M = 77.2, SD = 17.9; sometimes M = 74.1, SD = 21.7; always
M = 73.4, SD = 19.8; F = 0.14(N = 36, df = 2), p = 0.874]; or
by whether participants also participated in Study 3 [listed, no
M = 75.4, SD = 31.5, yes M = 88.3, SD = 15.3, t = −1.235(36),
p = 0.224; endorsed, no M = 72.3, SD = 20.9, yes M = 80.7,
SD = 17.1, t = 0.721(36), p = 0.476].
Participants listed several causes that we did not anticipate:
it was Reolo’s turn to succeed (anjara, an idiom for luck related
to astrology, N = 10), Reolo did not do bad things to neighbors
N = 1, Reolo had good parents N = 1, and Reolo had a favorable
astrological day N = 1 (we had asked about astrological destiny,
vinta, but neglected to ask about the related concept of andro, a
propitious day).
Participants primarily listed supernatural causes for Reolo’s
superior success: God N = 34 and ancestors N = 27, followed
by an important earthly cause, working hard N = 10. Only three
Mikea listed rainfall, and no one listed wind, pests, weeds, or
fertilizer, although they were endorsed fairly frequently when
listed by the researcher. Mikea listed a lesser percentage of
supernatural causes than did Vezo [Vezo M = 85.4, SD = 25.1;
Mikea M = 66.1, SD = 31.0; t = 2.01(36), p = 0.052], although
they endorsed a similar percentage of supernatural causes [Vezo
M= 76.9, SD= 20.3;MikeaM= 70.0, SD= 19.5; t= −0.980(36),
p = 0.334].
Discussion
When asked why individuals succeed or fail, our informants
primarily provided supernatural causes, in contrast to Study
1. Because informants cited natural and supernatural causes
at similar frequencies regardless of the version of the story
it does not appear that people apply competing causal
models to economic versus religious problems (target-dependent
thinking).
One could argue that the economic and religious versions
are not really all that diﬀerent because, while they present
diﬀerent contexts for Reolo and Tsiato’s meeting (market,
ceremony), they are both about economic outcomes (harvest). It
is interesting, then, that informants responded to them primarily
with supernatural causes; had one of the vignettes featured a
supernatural outcome (e.g., angry, dishonored ancestors) rather
than a harvest, it seems most likely this would also be explained
with supernatural causes.
The contrast between Study 1 and Study 2 suggests either
that southwestern Malagasy apply competing knowledges to
activity risk and personal risk (target dependence) or that they
understand activities to respond in predictable ways to natural
causes while the natural causes themselves are inﬂuenced by
supernatural rewards and sanctions for the farmer, forager, or
ﬁsherman (integrative thinking). Study 3 attempts to distinguish
between these possibilities.
Study 3: Sorting Causes into a Flow
This study used a sorting activity to discern people’s concepts
of the causal ﬂow linking natural and supernatural forces. Vezo
informants chose cards to represent God, ancestors, weather,
and harvest (catch of ﬁsh). They were asked how pairs of cards
inﬂuence one another, and were then asked to sort the cards
into a causal ﬂow. The method is similar to one used by Lynch
and Medin (2006) to examine how U.S. undergraduates, nurses,
and energy healers understand the physical and psychosocial
causes of heart attack and depression, and our predictions
follow their example. If southwestern Malagasy apply competing
knowledges to activity risk and personal risk (target dependence),
then we would expect them to create two separate chains, one
with God and ancestors inﬂuencing harvest and the other with
weather inﬂuencing harvest. If our informants understand no real
existential diﬀerence in natural and supernatural forces (synthetic
thinking), we would expect them to trace multiple bilateral
interactions among natural and supernatural forces, and alternate
their eﬀects within chains. Integrative thinkers would present
a hierarchy of causes with supernatural forces driving natural
forces; the cards would form a single chain indicating that while
supernatural and natural forces are diﬀerent, they occupy the
same causal system.
Sample
The sample included 22 Vezo adults (9 women, 13 men) in
the village of Lamboara. As with study 2, recruitment was
non-random and covered approximately a quarter of the adult
population in the village. Nine subjects were also participants in
study 2, which they may have done before or after this study.
Descriptive statistics are in Table 3.
Method
As with study 2, we attempted to interview individuals privately
but at times they were accompanied by a spouse, friend, or
children. After obtaining oral consent from the interviewee
we presented her with with six colored cards (white, black,
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red, yellow, blue, green) and quizzed her on the names of the
colors (one man could not name the colors; the interview was
terminated and he received the cash gift). We then asked the
informant to choose one card to represent God (Ndragnahare),
one to represent ancestors (raza), one to represent weather
(toets’andro), and one to represent harvest of ﬁsh (vokatse fia).
The informant was quizzed to see if she remembered what each
color represented.
Then we presented each of the 12 pairwise combinations of
two cards to the research participant and asked whether one force
could inﬂuence the other. “Inﬂuence” was diﬃcult to translate
into the local dialect of Malagasy. We used the verb mikomandy
(from the French verb commander; the French verb implies less
force than the English “command,” with a meaning closer to
“request”), mandily (a synonym for mikomandy), or magnina
(meaning to matter, to be the reason for). Informants switched
among these terms, suggesting that their meanings are roughly
equivalent in this context.
Next we asked the informant to place the four cards in rank
order by power. Once this was completed we asked them how
all four cards inﬂuenced one another together. We ended the
exercise by adding an additional card, usually the yellow one,
with the announcement that this represents spirits that possess
people (doane). The subject was then instructed to add this
card to the causal ﬂow. When the exercise was completed each
informant received a small cash gift (1000 MGA). This method
was approved by the University of Georgia’s Institutional Review
Board (MOD00001573).
Results and Discussion
The majority of the 22 participants chose to represent God
with the white card (N = 17), ancestors and weather with
black or red (ancestors six black, ﬁve red; weather eight black,
ﬁve red), and harvest with blue (N = 9) or green (N = 6).
Informants frequently substituted “wind” (taiky) for weather,
consistent with the importance of wind in the marine economy.
As Table 5 presents, informants were unanimous that God
may inﬂuence ancestors and weather but not vice versa, and
most said that God may inﬂuence harvest (N = 20) but not
vice-versa (N = 22). There was disagreement as to whether
ancestors inﬂuence weather (N = 3) or weather inﬂuences
ancestors (N = 4), but the majority answered no to both
questions. In the process of discussing the pairwise interactions,
14 of 22 volunteered that ancestors cannot inﬂuence weather
directly, but must beg God to change the weather. An additional
three people oﬀered that God cannot inﬂuence harvest directly,
TABLE 5 | Results of 12 questions asking, does factor X influence factor
Y? Does Y influence X? The table reports frequencies of yes responses.
First -> God Ancestors Weather Harvest
God 0/22 0/22 0/22
Ancestors 22/22 4/20 ∗ 1/22
Weather 22/22 3/20∗ 0/22
Harvest 20/22 22/22 22/22
∗These combinations were accidentally omitted in two cases.
but can only command the weather that in turn inﬂuences
harvest.
Twenty one informants sorted the cards by relative power,
with much agreement. All 21 placed God as the most powerful
force; 20 positioned harvest as the least powerful; and 20 ranked
weather and ancestors as intermediate in power (13 favored
ancestors, 6 favored weather, and 2 insisted they were of equal
power).
From the pairwise interactions in Table 5 we may infer the
causal ﬂow represented in Figure 1, in which God inﬂuences
everything, God is inﬂuenced by nothing, and God, weather, and
ancestors command the harvest of ﬁsh. When presented with
all four cards and asked to arrange cards into a causal ﬂow,
the majority of research participants who completed the exercise
produced the diﬀerent looking diagram in Figure 2. The method
was a challenging task, both because we had not worked out
a clear procedure for instructing informants in this exercise6,
and because some informants did not consider themselves
experts on such topics. Fourteen people completed the task. The
arrangement in Figure 2 was generated independently by 11
individuals.
There are two major diﬀerences between the causal ﬂows
depicted in Figures 1 and 2. First, in the second diagram
6The procedure we eventually developed was, after asking about causal inﬂuences
of pairs of cards, to graduate to combinations of three cards, then ﬁnally, the fourth.
FIGURE 1 | The causal flow among God, ancestors, weather, and
harvest implied by informant’s responses to pairwise questions, does
X influence Y? See text for the Malagasy meaning of “influence.”
FIGURE 2 | When asked specifically to organize the cards to a causal
flow, 11 informants produced this pattern.
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ancestors (and possessing spirits) may inﬂuence God. This key
diﬀerence is explained by the verb our informants used to
explain how ancestors inﬂuence God: by begging (mangatake),
which is less forceful than commanding (mikomandy, mandily)
and causing (magnina). Although we did not include a card
to represent people, participants also indicated that people beg
ancestors and spirits to beg God on their behalf, so that God
may command the weather to inﬂuence the harvest. The second
contrast is that in Figure 2 there are no direct arrows linking
ancestors and God to harvest. In Figure 2 ancestors and God
do inﬂuence harvest, consistent with Figure 1, but via the chain
of ancestors → God → weather → harvest of ﬁsh. This is
also consistent with the comments made by several informants
that God cannot inﬂuence harvest directly but may only do
by inﬂuencing the weather, and ancestors cannot inﬂuence the
harvest directly, but must ask God to change the weather.
The causal ﬂow represented in Figures 1 and 2 suggests that
natural and supernatural forces are arranged in a hierarchy,
and that supernatural forces drive natural forces, consistent with
integrative thinking.
General Discussion
The studies reviewed here support a speciﬁc form of integrative
thinking in which people ascribe activity risk to natural
factors (Study 1) and personal risk to supernatural factors
(Study 2), and supernatural and natural forces form a hierarchy
within a single explanatory system (Study 3). Natural and
supernatural causal forces occupy distinct categories, in contrast
to recent descriptions of indigenous American thinking (Descola,
1996; Viveiros de Castro, 2000), but do not form competing
epistemologies, as seems to be the case for many Westerners
when explaining life as resulting from evolution versus divine
creation (Evans et al., 2011), and death as biological cessation
versus afterlife (Harris and Giménez, 2005; Astuti and Harris,
2008).
We argue that when southwestern Malagasy reason about the
risk of farming, foraging, or ﬁshing activities, they reason within
a natural submodel or level of explanation represented by the
last two links in Figure 2’s causal chain, weather → harvest. In
an environment where rainfall is only predictable 28% of the
time, someone with good ecological knowledge may successfully
forecast weather and economic outcomes one third of the time,
while someone with bad knowledge leaves her fate completely to
chance. In the rural economy there is often a long delay between
cause (rainfall) and eﬀect (crop yield, prey abundance) so that
causality is diﬃcult to observe. Instead, people learn natural
causal models from others through cultural transmission (Boyd
and Richerson, 1988). That supernatural and natural forces are
categorically distinct, and the application of natural factors to
activity risk, allows people to share information about drought
tolerance and prey behavior while minimizing the distortions of
personal and social concerns.
But even with really good ecological knowledge,
the highly unpredictable climate means that people’s
predictions will often fail. By ascribing personal
successes and failures with the whole causal chain
(humans → ancestors → God → weather → harvest), the
Malagasy person may make sense of successes and failures
without doubting the validity of the ecological knowledge. We
predict that integrative thinking may be a common cognitive
strategy accompanying economic diversiﬁcation in risky
environments.
This argument is consistent with our ethnographic
observations. In our previous research in the region we
have had countless discussions with farmers, foragers, and
ﬁshermen about their subsistence decisions and economic
strategies, including such questions as when should one plant
swidden maize, how many grains to plant, what to do if the
crop does not germinate, how many times a manioc ﬁeld should
be weeded, how long manioc should be left in the ground to
mature, what variety of rice is most pest-resistant, how to ﬁnd
wild ovy tuber patches, how to tell when ovy patches have been
exhaustively harvest, what size gillnets are best for diﬀerent ﬁsh
species, etc. Almost unanimously, informants responded with
the sorts of agronomic and ecological factors that an outsider
without knowledge of local cosmology would expect. Meanwhile,
our ﬁeld notes describing the social life of Mikea, Masikoro, and
Vezo communities are replete with accounts of people worrying
about ancestors, navigating taboos, seeking benedictions in
ceremonies, and sorcery accusations.
Southwestern Malagasy seek creative ways to diversify their
income sources while also piously following their cosmo-rules.
We provide two examples. First, the doane spirits that possess
mediums typically cannot tolerate the presence of chickens, so
spirit mediums have a taboo forbidding them to eat or raise
chickens (faly akoho). When a spirit medium provides charms
and other prescriptions to a client, the medium commonly
insists that the client also avoid contact with chickens, lest the
potency of charms be annulled. Chickens and eggs have become
proﬁtable market commodities, due to the ease with which
they are produced and stable prices. Clients of spirit possession
commonly request that the doane spirit allow a waiver of the
chicken taboo, as long as chickens are only raised to convert to
cash. A second example involves labor migration among Vezo
ﬁshers, many of whom, during the past decade, have undergone
the long, dangerous ocean voyage to the region of Maintirano,
half the island’s length to the north, where, according to the
rumors, ﬁsheries oﬀer inexhaustible plenty and vendors buy
ocean products at good prices. The separation from family tombs,
elders, and possessing spirits adds signiﬁcant risk on top of the
physical risks of a long ocean voyage to an uncertain opportunity.
To balance pious conformity to cosmo-rules with behavioral
ﬂexibility, Vezo mariners consult with one or more magico-
religious leaders, including spirit mediums, diviners, and clan
heads, to request special dispensation from ritual duties and
protective charms.
The results reported here suggest that there may be
some interesting variation within our sample, among farmers,
foragers, and ﬁshermen. Vezo ﬁshing communities had less
consistent evaluations of risk than Masikoro, Mikea, or Tandroy
(although, as we argued, this could be because Vezo only
listed ﬁshing and marketing activities and there may be greater
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diﬀerences in risk among modes than activities). Mikea listed
more natural causes for Reolo’s superior success than did
Vezo. Masikoro, Mikea, and Vezo, and farmers, foragers, and
ﬁshermen, may approach the world somewhat diﬀerently for
both ecological and cultural reasons. Agriculture, foraging,
and ﬁshing represent diﬀerent intersections of human labor
to climate and environment. Farmers in the region spend
much of their time hoping for more rain while ﬁshermen
often want less rain and the right kinds of wind. Even
though there is ﬂuid movement among the three subsistence
modes, there are still farming, foraging, and ﬁshing modes
associated with Masikoro, Mikea, and Vezo identities, so
these communities are likely to maintain somewhat diﬀerent
knowledge.
The results of Study 1 also suggest that there may be
interesting diﬀerences in men and women’s causal knowledge.
As stated above, we do not have a good explanation for why
male focus groups exhibited greater agreement in risk ratings
than did female focus groups, especially considering that men and
women grow the same crops and forage for most of the same
terrestrial resources. Perhaps there are diﬀerences in women’s
mobility and knowledge of activities in distant subsistence modes.
It is also possible that men and women communicate ecological
knowledge in diﬀerent ways.
Our data do not addresswhether southwesternMalagasy apply
integrative thinking beyond the domain of subsistence, where the
hypervariable climate is not a direct inﬂuence on outcomes. In
a domain not so obviously connected to climate, that of death
and afterlife, Astuti and Harris (2008) found that Vezo adults
tended to explain death as biological cessation in the context of
a story about a malaria death in a hospital while explaining death
as continuity into the afterlife of ancestors in the context of a
story about a funeral. Astuti and Harris (2008), like us, argue that
biology and cosmology are not competing causal explanations,
but they do not present evidence whether or how these causal
models are integrated. Death in Madagascar is a risky venture,
as the dead cannot control how or where their body will be
handled or buried. It would be interesting to learn whether risk
and choice in this domain mirror or intersect with subsistence
decisions.
The pattern of integrative thinking that we have documented
for southwestern Madagascar echoes Evans-Pritchard’s (1937)
classic description of Zande witchcraft as an idiom of causality.
Is a hypervariable environment the reason for Zande integrative
thinking? The closest weather station to Zandeland in Dewar
and Richard’s (2007) comparative climate study was Yei, South
Sudan, which has a monthly rainfall predictability score of 0.527,
nearly double that of Toliara, Madagascar 0.281. It is unclear how
much unpredictability, and unpredictability of what, exactly, we
would expect to be associated with integrative thinking. Evans-
Pritchard argued that Zande witchcraft is a domain-general
causal model, applied not only to subsistence, but health, politics,
and domestic life. “There is no niche or corner of Azande
culture that [witchcraft] does not twist itself ” (Evans-Pritchard,
1937, p. 63). One possibility is that Zande witchcraft helps
people deal with amore domain-general form of unpredictability,
perhaps relating to social alliances. It may also be that integrative
thinking can be a tool to solve more than one set of ecological
challenges.
The causal ﬂow depicted in Figure 2 is not dissimilar from
what one might expect in Christianity and other Abrahamic
cosmologies. Just as a southwestern Malagasy person must beg
ancestors and other spirits to beg God for good fortune, so
a Catholic calls upon Jesus, the Virgin Mary, and Saints to
intercede on her behalf. We suspect that when southwestern
Malagasy convert to Christianity they simply insert Jesus into
the mediating role alongside ancestors and other spirits. Indeed,
it is not uncommon to hear our informants refer to Jesus as
the razambazaha, “the foreigners’ (or white people’s) ancestor.”
Thus “conversion” may result in minimal changes to cosmology,
culture, and behavior, which is consistent with our observations
that even clan heads, diviners, and spirit mediums are sometimes
ardent churchgoers.
Our interpretation that for southwestern Malagasy “natural”
and “supernatural” are distinct categories of causes and yet
integrated into a single causal model requires further discussion
and future research, given contradictory statements in the
literature that natural and supernatural knowledges are either
inherently diﬀerent or that the natural/supernatural dichotomy
is a ﬁgment of Western imagination. Boyer (2000) has argued
that causal knowledge of the natural world is an extension
of innate intuition while supernatural causality, by deﬁnition,
involves counter-intuitive twists on natural relationships that are
learned later in life. By contrast, some cultural anthropologists
have warned that dichotomies like mind/body, nature/culture,
and natural/supernatural are cultural artifacts of European
Enlightenment philosophy that are not shared by many non-
Western traditional cultures (Ingold, 1991, p. 362; Ortner,
1996; Lambek, 1998). Some anthropologists of religion argue
against the utility of the natural/supernatural dichotomy,
stating that many peoples see no diﬀerence in the realness
of rocks and rain versus ghosts and angels, and may see all
such forces as similarly animate and agentive (Lambek, 2008,
pp. 5–7).
Whether non-Western peoples dichotomize natural/
supernatural or other such knowledges is ultimately an empirical
question. The data presented here show that diﬀerent kinds of
questions yield diﬀerent sets of causes, suggesting that they are
distinct, but they are not dichotomous or opposed categories
because they do not contradict each other. Our data do not
address the question of what makes a causal force like rainfall or
ancestors ﬁt into one category or the other, nor whether “natural”
and “supernatural” mean the same thing to our informants as
these terms generally indicate in Western discourse.
A seemingly obvious diﬀerence between natural and
supernatural is that the supernatural is the domain of invisible
agents, where agents, after Leslie (1995), have mechanical
properties of force and energy, goal orientation, and cognition.
Natural causes, by contrast, are visible agents (pests), invisible
non-agents (wind), or visible non-agents (rainfall). However, it
is not diﬃcult to conjure contradictory examples. The Malagasy
astrological calendar is supernatural in that it provides what
Howell (2012) calls “cosmo-rules” to honor ancestors, possessing
spirits, and God, but astrology is not agentive for it does not
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think or pursue goals. The germ theory of disease constitutes a
natural force but involves invisible agents.
Could it be that when southwestern Malagasy discuss
climatic causes within their natural submodel or level of
causality, they understand “rainfall” and “wind” to be personiﬁed
agents with goal orientation and cognition, similar to how
they think about ancestors and God? When the ﬁrst author
suggested this “animistic” possibility to the Malagasy co-
authors, they initially found the question diﬃcult to understand.
We also found this to be a diﬃcult question to pose
to Vezo informants. Wind and rainfall, they insisted, were
just natural. But to the ﬁrst author’s confusion, the word
“natural” in Malagasy is voajanahare, which translates literally
as, “fruit of God” (work of God). Further research is
required to understand exactly what separates forces like rain,
wind, pests, and germs from ancestors, spirits, God, and
astrology.
Conclusion
This investigation of coexistence thinking was framed around
an apparent paradox in the ecology and culture of subsistence
risk in rural southwestern Madagascar. Crops fail and prey
become scarce because of climatic factors, which are highly
unpredictable; Masikoro, Mikea, and Vezo adapt to their
hypervariable environment via diversiﬁcation and behavioral
ﬂexibility. And crops fail and prey become scarce because of
the judgments and moods of spiritual agents; southwestern
Malagasy adapt to their high spiritual insecurity by narrowing
their range of behaviors, by following a pious code of
taboos, ritual prescriptions, and astrological proscriptions.
One possible cognitive explanation for this paradox is that
southwestern Malagasy maintain contradictory natural and
supernatural causal models in their heads and employ each
in certain circumstances. A second possibility is that they see
no paradox, for wind, rain, God, and ancestors belong to
the same category of causes that permits behavioral ﬂexibility
and pious conformity in diﬀerent circumstances. We interpret
the results of the three studies presented here as supporting
a third, integrative model, where ecological factors explain
why crops and ﬁelds fail, supernatural factors explain why
persons succeed or fail, and supernatural factors inﬂuence
economic outcomes via natural factors. We have argued that
this permits Masikoro farmers, Mikea foragers, and Vezo
ﬁshers to eﬀectively share ecological information undistorted
by personal concerns, while simultaneously giving reason for
why ecological knowledge fails without casting doubt about
the validity of the ecological knowledge. This is of course a
functionalist explanation; our data do not address the origins
of this purported cognitive adaptation to a hypervariable
environment.
It is diﬃcult to disentangle the inﬂuences of ecology and
culture on coexistence thinking with a single synchronic case
study. Culturally learned causal rules are part of how people
adapt to environmental challenges (Steward, 1955; Richerson
and Boyd, 2005), and it could be that integrative thinking is
a mental strategy developed rather recently by the ancestors
of today’s Masikoro, Mikea, and Vezo, or perhaps a broader
geographical range of Malagasy people. Yet cultural traditions
may persist that have neutral or negative eﬀects on people’s
survival (Durham, 1991); it is possible that southwestern
Malagasy integrative thinking is not adaptive, or did not develop
here because of its adaptive value, but was simply inherited
from previous generations as part of broader Austronesian
and East-African culture histories. This echoes a classic debate
in cultural ecology as to whether a society’s religious ideas
are peripheral with regards to ecological adaptation (Steward,
1955) or central to it (Rappaport, 1968). Future research
could explore people’s application of coexistence thinking
to subsistence risk through cross-cultural comparison, by
contrasting samples from places with diﬀerent levels of climate
unpredictability, both within Madagascar where people share
similar traditional beliefs, within the broader Austronesian
tradition of which Madagascar is a part, and in distantly or
unrelated cultures.
Researchers studying choice under risk within the
economic tradition have traditionally applied probability theory
and rational actor models to decision-analyses, implicitly
promoting a psychic unity of humankind by which all
peoples make similar decisions for similar reasons. Our
research suggests that risk-sensitive decision-making may
depend on the local ecology and culture and whether
people employ target-dependent, synthetic, or integrative
thinking. This argument emphasizes cultural relativism while
simultaneously providing a framework for the kinds of
cultural-cognitive variations we may expect to ﬁnd in diﬀerent
settings.
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